Rational Decisions

Name: Rational Decisions
Brand: PRINCETON UNIVRSITY PRESS
SKU: 401116
Price: 36.20 EUR
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KEN BINMORE

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ISBN

9780691130743

Mladinska knjiga ID

401116

Leto izida

2009

Status dobavljivosti

Na zalogi pri dobavitelju

Jezik

ANG

Založnik

PRINCETON UNIVRSITY PRESS

Avtor

KEN BINMORE

Opis

It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world. This book explains the foundations of this theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds.Preface ix Chapter 1: Revealed Preference 1 1.1 Rationality? 1 1.2 Modeling a Decision Problem 2 1.3 Reason Is the Slave of the Passions 3 1.4 Lessons from Aesop 5 1.5 Revealed Preference 7 1.6 Rationality and Evolution 12 1.7 Utility 14 1.8 Challenging Transitivity 17 1.9 Causal Utility Fallacy 19 1.10 Positive and Normative 22 Chapter 2: Game Theory 25 2.1 Introduction 25 2.2 What Is a Game? 25 2.3 Paradox of Rationality? 26 2.4 Newcomb's Problem 30 2.5 Extensive Form of a Game 31 Chapter 3: Risk 35 3.1 Risk and Uncertainty 35 3.2 Von Neumann and Morgenstern 36 3.3 The St Petersburg Paradox 37 3.4 Expected Utility Theory 39 3.5 Paradoxes from A to Z 43 3.6 Utility Scales 46 3.7 Attitudes to Risk 50 3.8 Unbounded Utility? 55 3.9 Positive Applications? 58 Chapter 4: Utilitarianism 60 4.1 Revealed Preference in Social Choice 60 4.2 Traditional Approaches to Utilitarianism 63 4.3 Intensity of Preference 66 4.4 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility 67 Chapter 5: Classical Probability 75 5.1 Origins 75 5.2 Measurable Sets 75 5.3 Kolmogorov's Axioms 79 5.4 Probability on the Natural Numbers 82 5.5 Conditional Probability 83 5.6 Upper and Lower Probabilities 88 Chapter 6: Frequency 94 6.1 Interpreting Classical Probability 94 6.2 Randomizing Devices 96 6.3 Richard von Mises 100 6.4 Refining von Mises' Theory 104 6.5 Totally Muddling Boxes 113 Chapter 7: Bayesian Decision Theory 116 7.1 Subjective Probability 116 7.2 Savage's Theory 117 7.3 Dutch Books 123 7.4 Bayesian Updating 126 7.5 Constructing Priors 129 7.6 Bayesian Reasoning in Games 134 Chapter 8: Epistemology 137 8.1 Knowledge 137 8.2 Bayesian Epistemology 137 8.3 Information Sets 139 8.4 Knowledge in a Large World 145 8.5 Revealed Knowledge? 149 Chapter 9: Large Worlds 154 9.1 Complete Ignorance 154 9.2 Extending Bayesian Decision Theory 163 9.3 Muddled Strategies in Game Theory 169 9.4 Conclusion 174 Chapter 10: Mathematical Notes 175 10.1 Compatible Preferences 175 10.2 Hausdorff's Paradox of the Sphere 177 10.3 Conditioning on Zero-Probability Events 177 10.4 Applying the Hahn-Banach Theorem 179 10.5 Muddling Boxes 180 10.6 Solving a Functional Equation 181 10.7 Additivity 182 10.8 Muddled Equilibria in Game Theory 182 References 189 Index 197